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Krishnan Srinivasarengan, Taha Boukhobza, Samir Aberkane and Vincent Laurain
Abstract—Detecting leaks in Water Distribution Networks
(WDN) using sensors has become crucial towards an efficient
management of water resources. The leak detection methods
that use this data rely on the correctness of the acquired
data. However, this assumption is often violated in practice.
Consequently, leak detection under sensor faults is a problem
of practical importance. This relates to the more general prob-
lem of simultaneous detectability in sensor and process faults
for a class of systems modelled as a network, by exploiting
the redundancies available through the topological relationship
between the sensors. This paper hence aims at i) modeling WDN
as graphs containing both systems and sensors faults ii) providing
theoretical joint detectability results for such graphs and iii)
applying these results to the scenario of leak identification under
sensor faults conditions on real data issued from a rural WDN.
Index Terms—Fault Detectability, Water Distribution Net-
works, Leak Detection, Topological Graph model, Solvability.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Water distribution networks (WDN) are an integral part of
the urban and rural infrastructure. Water loss due to leaks is
one of the significant contributors to the inefficient operation
of a WDN. For example, France suffers from distribution
losses of nearly 20% and with more than 1000m3 of loss
per kilometre of pipelines every year [1]. Hence the problem
of leak detection has long been of interest to researchers and
engineers.
The interest in remote detection of leaks in water distri-
bution network grew to prominence with the installation of
sensors in the WDN. These techniques evolve along with
the theoretical developments in the control-theoretic and data
analysis community. A standard approach to leak detection in
the literature deploys flow sensors at the entrance of DMAs
(District Metering Area) and a host of pressure sensors at the
pipe junctions. The former helps in detecting the faults while
the latter helps to localize them. Model-based approaches have
been quite popular in the literature (see for instance, [2], [3],
[4]). The premise largely rests on developing a model of the
network and then develop appropriate observers or estimation
techniques that can detect and isolate leaks. The developed
solution is then typically tested on an EPANET [5] model
of a real water network or on data from a real network (e.g.,
[2]). Data-based models feature prominently in the literature in
recent times. This includes the use of Support Vector Machine
(SVM) models in [6], [7], Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
models in [8]), a graph-based spectral clustering in [9], and an
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Fig. 1: A schematic of a part of a WDN
innovative leak signature space approach for leak localisation
in [10]. [11] proposes an intuitive approach with a multi-stage
graph partitioning aids in progressively localisation faults.
When analysing a WDN during its normal operation, one
faces sensor faults that manifest in various forms, such as
missing data, measurement drift/bias, stuck at a value, etc.
Unfortunately, the leak detection literature does not typically
consider sensor faults, since simultaneous system/sensor fault
detection requires specific assumptions, whether they are tem-
poral conditions [12], physical modeling assumptions [13] or
probabilistic assumptions [14].
It is evident from the brief literature survey that an inter-
connected nature of the underlying system offers an opportu-
nity to distinguish the sensor and process faults. This takes
importance in the context of the rise of large scale and cyber-
physical systems [15], where a network of sensors monitor the
performance of the system. In the literature, one can find the
use of graph-theoretic models for various problems in WDNs
such as the analysis of structural robustness [16], observability
analysis [17], leak detection [18], model decomposition [19],
and sensor placement [20]. Our interest lies in understanding
the structural properties of a system such as the WDN, as
treated in pioneering works such as [18] and more recent work
as [17].
This paper exploits the natural interconnected structure of
the WDN as in Fig 1, and the redundancy in sensors that
arises as a result. In this example, each yi represents a flow
sensor, and it is clear that any water flowing through y3 must
flow through y2 and y1 beforehand. This realistic physical
representation naturally leads to the well-suited tools of graph.
The aim of this paper can hence be summed up as: is it
possible, using a sensor network with certain redundancies,
to distinguish system faults from sensor faults using graph
theory theoretic tools? The results presented in this paper
has its origins on the analysis on a rural WDN instrumented
with flow sensors, and where the process faults represent the
leaks or abnormal consumption. Nevertheless, the problem of
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simultaneously distinguishing process and sensor faults in an
interconnected system is more generic, and can encompass a
wide range of problems.
The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as:
• Novel use of topological methods to capture the process
and sensor faults through graph models
• Graph-theoretic conditions for the (simultaneous) de-
tectability of the process and sensor faults
• As an application of the detectability conditions, an
algorithm to estimate of leaks in a rural WDN
In Sec. II, we introduce some preliminary notations and
definitions, in particular the graph theoretic concepts used
in this paper. Sec. III provides a graph modelling of WDN.
In Sec. IV, the detectability problem is presented along with
the derivation of the graph-theoretic detectability conditions,
which is the core contribution of the paper. Based on the
presented results, a novel algorithm for an explainable leak
estimation is provided in the Sec. V and is tested both on a
simulated dataset and real dataset obtained from a section of
a rural WDN. We conclude the paper with a few remarks and
an outline for the future work in Sec. VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
G Graph
EG Edge set of the graph G
VG Vertex or node set of the graph G
|X| Cardinality of the set X
IG Incidence matrix of graph G
B. Graph preliminaries
For the following definitions, consider a graph, G(EG, VG).
Path and directed path: A path in a graph is a sequence of
edges which joins a sequence of distinct vertices. A directed
path in a directed graph is a sequence of edges which joins
a sequence of distinct vertices, with all the edges directed in
the same direction.
Cycles and directed cycles: A cycle in a graph is a non-
empty path in which the only repeated vertices are the first
and last vertices. A directed cycle in a directed graph is a
non-empty directed path in which the only repeated vertices
are the first and last vertices.
Tree: A tree is an undirected graph which has the following
equivalent properties:
• |EG| = |VG|−1, that is the number of edges in the graph
is one less than the number of vertices
• There exists a unique path between a vertex and any other
vertex
• There are no cycles
Directed acyclic graph (DAG): A finite directed graph with
no directed cycles.
Polytree or a directed tree: A directed acyclic graph whose
underlying undirected graph is a tree.
Connectivity or Connectedness: Two vertices u and v are
called connected if the graph G contains a path from u to v.
Otherwise, they are called disconnected.
Connected graph: An undirected graph is connected if it
has at least one vertex and there is a path between every pair
of vertices.
Connected Components: A connected component of an
undirected graph is a subgraph where there is a path from
every node to every other node within the component.
Weakly Connected graph: A directed graph is called weakly
connected if replacing all of its directed edges with undirected
edges produces a connected (undirected) graph.
Incidence matrix: The incidence matrix IG of the directed
graph G with |V | vertices and |E| edges is defined as :
IG(i, j) = +1 if edge j has its arrow leaving node i
−1 if edge j has its arrow entering node i
0 if edge j is not incident on node i
The incidence matrix is of size |V | × |E|
C. Assumptions
Assumption 1: The WDN under study has a hierarchical
structure of water flowing from source to multiple consump-
tion zones. There are no loops that encompass multiple flow
sensors meaning that a given flow sensor cannot be upstream
of itself. This assumption is reasonable mostly in rural net-
works.
Assumption 2: Throughout the paper, it is considered that
the system under study is static. This is reasonable, since in a
WDN, the sampling frequency is typically much lower than the
actual dynamics of the system. Nevertheless, the same analysis
could be extended to dynamical cases.
III. GRAPH MODELLING
In this section, we illustrate the generic modelling of a
WDN into a graph, accounting for sensor faults. For the sake
of readability, this generic procedure is illustrated through
the example of a WDN portion represented in Fig. 1. The
modelling process consists in three steps:
a) Transform the sensor network into an equivalent electrical
circuit (to provide an intuitive understanding of this
procedure as well)
b) Transform the equivalent circuit into a graph
c) Transform the measured information into residuals
which are detailed in the next section.
A. Electrical Equivalent circuit
The approach takes a cue from the topological methods
prominent in the electrical circuits (see for instance, [21]). It
is comparable to the classical work in [18] with the addition
of sensor fault in the mix. Note that measuring flow in a water
network is equivalent to measure the current in an electrical
circuit. In this sense, any water consumption can be viewed as
adding a current consuming resistance which might be known
or in the case of leaks, unknown. Consequently, the WDN in
Fig. 1 is equivalent to the electrical circuit Fig. 2 where the
water consumption is represented by a Resistance (thanks to
Assumption 2) : the current flowing through a resistance RCi
represents the entire consumption (regular consumption Ci and
process fault like leaks Li) at a given point. Please note that
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Fig. 2: Electrical equivalent circuit model of WDN
dynamical study could be driven in the same way by adding
other components like inductances or capacitors.
Process faults (leaks) display the same behaviour as regular
consumption, but are anomalous in nature. Meanwhile, sensor
faults (in current sensors) can be visualized as injection of
current into and out of the paths on either side of the ammeter.
This in turn can be viewed simply as a controlled current
source in opposition to the ammeter (or the flow sensor), with
the magnitude equal to that of the fault as shown in Fig. 3.
A
yi
Di
−Di A
yi
Di
Fig. 3: Equivalent circuit for sensor faults
B. Equivalent graph
In order to make use of graph theory to obtain fault
detectability conditions, the electrical circuit is turned into a
graph. To ensure that the pipe junctions (such as those between
y1,y2 and y4 in this example) do not interfere in the graph
representation, the sensors are represented by edges while
the vertices represent physical consumptions points (DMAs).
This representation is original in its form as typical graph
representations would consider sensor measurements at the
nodes and the system dynamics on the edges. The extra nodes
of X and 0 refer to the source and sink nodes for the network
respectively. This leads to the fact that water consumption at
a particular DMA is an edge linking the respecting node and
the sink node. Finally the sensor faults are represented by
edges oriented from a sensor downstream node towards the
sensor upstream node. This results, in our example, the graph
represented in Fig. 4.
C. Turning the measurements into residuals
The ultimate aim of the graph formulation remains to
estimate leaks and faults. One last remaining problem in
X 1 2 3
4 0
y1 y2 y3
y4 L1 + C1 L2 + C2 L3 + C3
L4 + C4
D1 D2 D3
D4
Fig. 4: An equivalent graph model with leaks and faults added
(The edge colouring is for the sake of readability)
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Fig. 5: Graph model (GFR) for analysis
the obtained graph is the inability to separate the regular
consumptions Ci from the system faults Li. This can be done
by simply subtracting any model-predicted estimate of the
consumption Mi from the measured information yi leading
to residuals Ei = yi − Mi. Mi can be issued from any
kind of model (data-based models, system physical models,
a priori information, etc.). Should the Mi be precise enough,
subtracting the prediction from the measurement is equivalent
to removing all regular consumptions terms from the graph.
Finally, it is intuitive to notice that the source node X
provides exactly the sum of consumptions arriving at the sink
node 0. therefore these nodes are redundant and can be com-
bined without affecting the analysis on the other nodes. We
refer to the 0 node as the reference node/vertex in this paper.
In the electrical circuit paradigm, this operation is equivalent
to short-circuiting a voltage source. A more formal analysis
of this merging for topological analysis can be referred from
Theorem 6.3.1 in [21]. The resulting graph corresponding to
that of our example is presented in Fig. 5.
In the rest of the paper, the resulting graph (such as
represented in Fig. 5 in our example), containing both the
residual and fault edges, is denoted as GFR. It is important
to note that the residual edges (in blue) represent measured
information and a known quantity, while the fault edges (in
red and green) represent unknown quantities.
Furthermore the following notations will also be used:
• the residual graph obtained from GFR by removing the
fault edges is denoted GR
• the fault graph from GFR by removing the residual edges
is denoted GF
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D. Properties of the Obtained Graphs
Firstly, Assumption 1 can be reformulated as the following
assumption
Assumption 1b: The equivalent graph of the underlying
water distribution network GR is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG).
Moreover, We note the following properties of these graphs:
• GR is a directed tree.
• All the process fault (leak) edges are incident on the
reference node 0.
• The sensor fault edges are in opposition to the corre-
sponding residue edges.
• All the three graphs have the same set of nodes. We would
refer to their vertex set as VGFR .
• There is at most one outgoing sensor fault edge per node.
• There is at most one outgoing process fault edge per node.
Lemma 1: The following are some properties of GF
1) GF contains connected components that involve the
nodes of GFR. Each node in GFR belongs to one and
only one of the below components.
2) The graph GF may consist of the following types of
components:
a) UCi: nUC unconnected nodes
b) GFSi : nS weakly connected components with only
sensor fault edges
c) GFPS : 1 weakly connected component which has
the reference node and possibly the process faults
and sensor faults edges
Proof:
1) GF is obtained by removing the residue edges on GFR.
The connected components are formed based on the fault
edges left out. Hence a node can be part of only one of
the connected components in GF .
2) Since GF contains two types of edges, the connected
components of types 2a and 2b are a consequence of a
simple combination. For the case of the component type
2c, note the following:
• By construction, all the process fault edges are
incident on the reference node (if present). Hence
there can be only one component that contains all
process fault edges.
• If a sensor fault edge is incident on the reference
node and there are process fault edges in GF ,
then this sensor fault edge would be part of this
component.
• Let’s denote the set of nodes with an outgoing
process fault edge as VP . These nodes are present
in the component type 2c as pointed out earlier.
Further, it is possible that a node (or several nodes)
is connected to a node in VP through sensor fault
edges. Hence these nodes and the sensor fault edges
would also belong to the connected component of
type 2c.
E. Example
As an example, consider the equivalent graph of a WDN
with leaks and sensor faults as given in Fig. 6. The equivalent
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
E1 E2 E3
E4 E5 E6
L3
L5
D3
D4 D5
Fig. 6: Example graph GFR
(a)
UC1
6
(b)
GFS1
1
4
D4
(c)
GFPS
0
2 3
5
L3
L5
D3
D5
Fig. 7: Connected Components in GF
GF graph after removing the residue edges, composed of FS1 ,
UC1 and GFPS is given in Fig. 7.
The next section defines the problem of detectability for a
given graph.
IV. FAULT DETECTABILITY
A. Problem formulation
In this section, we formulate the simultaneous detectabil-
ity problem, which implicitly tackles the distinguishability
of two types of faults, the process faults and the sensor
faults. If we only consider process faults, the detectability
property is equivalent to the topological observability problem
treated in the literature ([18], [17]). However, the presence of
sensor faults necessitates a reformulation of the topological
observability problem. Note that, similar to the topological
observability, simultaneous detectability refers to a generic
property. Hence practical detectability can breakdown for
particular fault values.
In practice, fault detection is a two-step operation. One
estimates the variables which are monitored in the first step. In
the second step, this estimation is compared with a threshold,
and if it exceeds the threshold, a fault is detected. The
threshold option, however, is unique to each problem, and
can not be generalized. Hence, we concentrate on the first
step, the ability to estimate the faults, and use it to validate
the underlying system’s detectability property. This transforms
the problem of detectability into the ability to estimate the
unknown variables (the process and sensor faults in our case).
This leads to the following definition for the graph GFR
that contains the known residues and the unknown faults.
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Definition 1: A graph is termed detectable if all the un-
known faults in it are solvable.
Topological methods concern performing nodal analysis on
a graph’s nodes [21] and leads to a set of linear equations.
Hence, the detectability of the unknowns in a graph can be
captured through the solvability of the unknowns in these lin-
ear equations. One computationally convenient way to capture
these linear equations is using the graph’s incidence matrix
[22]. If we refer to X as the set of all variables of interest in
a graph (Ei, Li, Di in case of the graph GFR), then the set
of nodal equations (for a given configuration of process and
sensor faults) is given by:
IGFRX = 0 (1)
It is evident that the solvability (and hence the detectability) of
the faults Li, Di can be inferred from (1). However, to glean
out the solvability from this equation, we need to focus on a
part of the matrix IGFR . We do this by grouping the known
and unknown variables as,
AGFXF = BGRXR (2)
where XF is a vector that contains all the faults and is of
length |EGF | and XR contains the residues and of length
|EGR |. Here EGF and EGR refer to the edge set of the graphs
GF and GR respectively. The matrix AGF is of dimension
|VGFR | × |EGF | and BGR of dimension |VGFR | × |EGR |.
One can note that AGF and BGR are the incidence matrices
of the graphs GF and GR respectively (with appropriately
modified sign conventions). It is hence possible to characterize
the solvability and hence the detectability through the analysis
of the matrix ranks in (2).
Our interest is to understand if this can be achieved by
directly analyzing the underlying graphs, in particular, GF .
Problem statement and solution approach
At time t, given a static sensor network, its associated
residuals Ei represented by its graph GR that satisfies the
Assumption 1b, a set of possible faults (process or sensor)
represented by a graph GF , what are the conditions under
which GF is detectable?
Since GF represents N = nUC+nS+1 subgraphs (Lemma
1). The global detectability problem of GF in (2) is equivalent
to the solvability of each component of GF and therefore, can
be split in nS + 1 subproblems (Unconnected components do
not contain any unknowns):
{
AGFPSXFPS = BGFPSXRPS
AGFSi
XFSi = BGFSiXRSi ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , nS ]
(3)
Where
AGFPS ∈ R
|VGFPS |×|EGFPS |
XGFPS ∈ R
|EGFPS |×1
BFPS ∈ R|VGFPS |×(|VGFPS |−1)
XRPS ∈ R(|VGFPS |−1)×1
and
AGFSi
∈ R|VGFSi |×|EGFSi |, XFPS ∈ R
|EGFSi |×1
BGFSi
∈ R|VGFSi |×(|VGFSi |−1)
XFSi ∈ R
(|VGFSi |−1)×1
∀i ∈ [1, . . . , nS ]
For readability’s sake each subproblem is denoted in the
rest of the paper as
AGFjXFj = BGFjXRj∀i ∈ [1, . . . , nS + 1] (4)
In order to present the detectability results, some prelimi-
naries are required.
B. Preliminaries
Lemma 2 ([22], [23]): If IG is an incidence matrix of a
connected graph G with n vertices, the rank of IG is n − 1.
If there are m connected components, then the rank is n−m.
Definition 2 (Reduced incidence matrix): The reduced in-
cidence matrix of a connected graph with |V | nodes and |E|
edges is any (|V | − 1)× |E| block of its incidence matrix.
Lemma 3 ([23]): The reduced incidence matrix of a directed
tree is nonsingular.
Remark 1: The above properties of the incidence matrix
informs us that the set of linear equations represented by (1)
is always consistent. That is, the equations lead to either a
unique or infinitely many solutions.
C. Main result
Theorem 1: GF is detectable if and only if every connected
component of GF is a directed tree.
Proof:
Sufficiency: If a given connected component is a directed
tree, the following are the consequences:
• The number of unknowns (faults) |XGFj | in each of the
connected component GFj , is equal to the number of
edges EGFj = |VGFj − 1|.
• The reduced incidence matrices of GFj has a rank
|VGFj − 1| (as per Lemma 3).
This means that, for each component of GF there are equal
number of independent rows (and hence nodal equations) as
the number of faults. Hence the faults are solvable, every GFj
is detectable and GF is detectable.
Necessity: By assuming that GF and consequently all its
components GFj are detectable, then we have :
|EGFj | ≤ |VGFj | − 1 (5)
This is a consequence of Lemma 2 and that all the matrices
AGFj have a rank |VGFPS | − 1. The following are the known
properties of the connected component FPS ,
• In every GFj , there is one node that has no outgoing
edges.
• Every other node in GFj has at least one outgoing or
incoming edge.
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This means, the number of edges is at least one less than the
number of nodes in GFj . Hence,
|EGFj | ≥ |VGFj | − 1 (6)
By putting together (5) and (6), we get
|EGFj | =|VGFj | − 1 ⇒ GFjare Directed Trees
⇒ GF contains only Directed Trees (7)
This completes the proof. 
D. Discussion
Remark 2 (Computational complexity): Theorem 1 states
that checking if GF is a directed tree is sufficient to assess
the detectability of GF . The complexity of such an algorithm
is O(n). In case of a depth-first search approach, the worst-
case scenario is with n = |VGF |+ |EGF |. On the other hand,
to verify detectability using the matrix rank of A would be
of the order of O(n3) when using Gaussian elimination [24].
Some approaches offer better complexity, but all of them are
polynomial-time algorithms.
Hence the graphical approach offers a faster way to verify
detectability for large scale systems or if one has to perform
this operation several times.
Remark 3: Since GFSi (∀i) are directed trees by construc-
tion, Theorem 1 illustrates that GF can be undetectable if
and only if GFPS is undetectable. Hence it is sufficient to
verify only the detectability of this connected component.
More generally, one tests whether the connected component
containing the reference node is a directed tree or not. This is
summarized in the Algo. 1.
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for the detectability of faults
1: Given: GF
2: Obtain the set of connected components GFPS and
GFSi (i = 1, ..nS) in GF
3: if GFPS is a directed tree then
4: Detectable
5: else
6: Not detectable
7: end if
Remark 4: If a given GF is declared undetectable, one can
still extract a part of the detectable faults. For instance, all
connected components of type GFSi are detectable. Further,
one can remove vertices in GFPS to determine which sensor
causes undetectability.
Corollary 1: If all vertices in the graph GFR contain at most
one sensor fault or one process fault simultaneously, then GF
is detectable.
Proof: If all vertices in the graph GFR contain at most
one sensor fault or one process fault, then GFPS is a directed
tree by construction.
Remark 5: GF presented in Fig. 7 is not detectable since
GFPS is not a directed tree.
V. APPLICATION: LEAK AND SENSOR FAULT ESTIMATION
IN A WDN
This section presents the application of the above results in
the context of leak estimation in a WDN. This work derives
motivation from the necessity of an efficient monitoring of a
water network (to avoid leaks) through a more intuitive and
explainable estimation.
In this problem, the graph GR is known (and hence the
structure of the sensor network and the water flow directions
are known). If the true structure of GF was a priori known
and detectable, then the faults XF of GF could be estimated
using simple least squares on a residues data series XR:
XˆF = min
XF
‖AGFXF −BGRXR‖2 (8)
However, it is not known a priori which faults are present
on the network at any given time. Consequently it is also not
known what is the true GF and whether it is detectable or not.
Hence, the estimation problem can be summarized as: Given
GR and the associated sensor data, is it possible to find GˆF ,
an estimate of the true fault graph GF , along with the values
of the associated faults XF contained in it?
Since GˆF is unknown, one strategy would be to assume a
general underlying fault structure GF where every node has a
leak and every sensor is faulty. And all these leaks and faults
are stacked in a vector XF . For example, for the WDN as in
Fig. 1, the set GF is shown in Fig. 5. Naturally, this problem
is over-parameterized since |EGF | = 2 × (|VGF | − 1). This
consequently needs some regularization.
In order to regularize this problem, the following assump-
tion is made: the most likely structure of GˆF is the one fitting
the data while requiring the least number of variables. This
is an `2 − `0 problem which can be relaxed using the well-
known `2 − `1 LASSO regularization method. One can add
temporal information, fault shapes, etc., to be included in the
optimization problem. However, the aim of this section is not
to formulate an optimization problem that can provide the
best estimate, but to illustrate the use of the underlying graph
structure in the estimation that can provide a more explainable
estimation. Consequently, the proposed optimization scheme
is not discussed in this paper. It can only be said that the
assumption is safe in a WDN where leaks and sensor faults
are repaired when detected.
Further, one can add physical constraints such as the positiv-
ity of leaks (water can only flow out of the network), leading
to the final optimization criterion as:
XˆF = minXF
‖AGFXF−BGRXR‖2+λ‖XF‖1
s.t Li > 0 ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , |EGR | − 1] (9)
where λ is the so-called regularization hyper-parameter.
This problem can be written as a quadratic minimization
problem under linear matrix inequality constraints and using
quadratic programming.
Remark 6: A note on the optimization formulation. The
detectability of GF does not guarantee the convergence to the
true solution (as the detectability property is bound to a given
structure and not the solution). Therefore, it is possible that
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this problem has multiple solutions where different structures
minimize (9). In practice, there are several reasons possible:
the true structure GF is not a solution of (9), or it does not
fit the regularization assumption (minimizing the number of
faults), or perhaps that it is not be detectable. Consequently it
can only be claimed that GˆF is guaranteed to lie within the
set of solutions of (9) if and only if GF is detectable and its
fault norm is minimal.
Even under these conditions, solving this problem using
quadratic programming presents several drawbacks:
• If (9) has more than one solutions, a gradient descent
algorithm will stop at one of the minima and provide only
one solution (even if the proposed GˆF is detectable).
• Gradient descent algorithm for quadratic programming
under linear constraints can be time consuming (consid-
ering one data point every 15 minutes, then estimating the
leaks over a year of data corresponds to 35040 estimation
problems in the form of (9)).
• The requirement for tuning the hyper-parameter λ.
In this paper, the quadratic programming implementation of
the optimization problem in (9) is referred to as QP-Lasso.
The next section depicts how the optimization problem in (9)
can be constrained using the proposed Theorem 1.
A. Proposed algorithm
Thanks to Theorem 1, it is possible to a priori determine a
finite set G¯F of all possible detectable graphs GF . Doing so
presents many advantages:
• Since GˆF is searched within a finite set G¯F , it reduces
the number of possible solutions in order to speed up
the process. Furthermore, detectable graphs represent
full rank equation systems, for which it is possible to
use directly the optimization scheme (8). Consequently,
simple analytic least-squares method can be used in order
to further computationally speed up the process.
• Since G¯F is finite, it is possible to compute all the
solutions of (9). It is therefore possible to hand out a
set of possible solutions (computed as the minimum-
maximum range of the given faults among all detectable
solutions found) in which the true underlying graph GF
is guaranteed to lie, if it is detectable.
Hence, the global optimization problem at hand in (9) can be
split into several steps presented in Algorithm 2. One could
argue that the computation time gained from using multiple
well-posed problems in PART 2, instead of a regularized
global problem (9) may be counteracted by the computation
time of PART 1 (determining G¯F ). However, while the leak
estimation is an online problem solved on a fix sensor network,
the possibly time consuming PART 1 will be computed only
once. This online/offline splitting is not possible when using
the QP-Lasso approach.
In the next section, Algorithm 2 is compared to QP-Lasso
implementation in (9) on a simulated dataset from the network
depicted in Fig. 1. The use of simulated data is to show the
differences between the QP-Lasso and the proposed algorithm.
In the subsequent section, data from a real network with the
same structure as Fig. 1 is used to illustrate the proposed
Algorithm 2 An algorithm to identify leaks in a WDN
1: Input: a graph GR and sensor data
2: PART 1: Determine the set G¯F of all detectable GF
containing |VGR | − 1 edges by repeated application of
Algo. 1.
3: PART 2:
4: for every GjF ∈ G¯F do
5: Solve AGjFX
j
F = BGjRX
j
R (or (8) if the leak are
identified from several data points)
6: Test if all Leaks in XjF are positive. If so, consider
the model valid. If not, the identified model is declared
invalid
7: Compute the `1 norm |XjF |
8: end for
9: Output: All valid GjF presenting the smallest value for
|XjF |
Fig. 8: Leak Estimation results at Zone 1 (Simulated data)
algorithm. Before we present the results, some implementation
details are given as follows:
Number of Unknowns: For the network in Fig. 1, 7 un-
knowns are considered. This includes a leak and fault in
each node except at node 1, where the leak and fault are
not distinguishable. Hence we consider only one unknown at
this node (referred to as leak in the following) for which the
positivity constraints are not applied.
B. Simulated data
We illustrate the differences between the QP-Lasso opti-
mization and the proposed algorithm over data simulated from
the topology given in Fig. 1.
The fault-leak combinations of 4 elements is the maximum
number of unknowns that can be estimated. We simulated all
the 21 detectable structures and 14 undetectable ones. Further,
we also simulated the 21 undetectable structures of 5 faults.
In order to provide a cleaner visualization, only a reduced
number of simulations are displayed in Fig. 8-11. Note that,
to show the leaks and faults in the same figure, we have a
custom y-axis label that is set to zero at two y-axis points to
indicate the reference for the two signals being shown.
The estimation from the proposed algorithm is given by
the black lines which sometimes encompass a shaded cyan
region. The cyan region to illustrate the range over which the
estimated leaks can take values that arises due to the `1 norms
of several fault-leak combinations being the same.
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Fig. 9: Leak/Fault Estimation at Zone 2 (Simulated data)
Fig. 10: Leak/Fault Estimation at Zone 3 (Simulated data)
Fig. 11: Leak/Fault Estimation at Zone 4 (Simulated data)
• Cases 1 to 7, and 9 represent the scenario where GF is
detectable and a solution of (9).
• Cases 8, 10 and 11 represent the scenario where GF is
detectable but is not a solution of (9) (other structures fit
the data with smaller `1 norm).
• Case 12 and 13 represent the scenario where the true
structure is undetectable.
In all cases, λ = 0.05 was used as the parameter for
the QP-Lasso implementation (using larger λ values resulted
larger bias in the results). Even though only 13 combinations
are displayed, the following conclusion remain true for all
combinations of the simulated data.
• If the solution to (9) is unique, then QP-Lasso and
Algorithm 2 give identical results (up to numerical bias
implied by the `1 regularization).
• If (9) has multiple solutions, then the unique QP-Lasso
solution is always in the range of solutions provided by
Algorithm 2.
• If the true structure GF is a solution of (9), then it lies
in the range of the solutions provided by Algorithm 2.
This is represented by cases 1 to 9 in Fig. 8-11.
• For each data point, QP-Lasso took 3.9ms and the online
part of the proposed algorithm took 0.09ms. The one-time
offline part of the algorithm to compute the detectable
combinations took 16ms. These simulation results were
performed on the MATLAB computing environment us-
ing a PC running Intel i7-8550U processor.
This example shows that the proposed algorithm has at
least the same performance over QP-Lasso at a much lower
computational cost in the online process. At the same time, the
algorithm provides the flexibility to understand the ambiguity
in the final estimation providing a range of values over which
the unknowns can lie.
C. Real data
The data used in this paper comes from a French collab-
oration project, SPHEREAU1, which aims to optimize the
overall functioning of a rural water distribution network. We
study a rural collective-operated water distribution network
in the GrandEst region in France. The network gets water
from two sources with the pipes run about 300 km serving
nearly 15000 habitants spread over 50 different communes.
The instrumentation system is largely composed of water flow
meters with level sensors augmenting them whenever there are
water reservoirs.
The dataset used in this paper is composed of 484 days of
data with measurement every 15 minutes, and for the purposes
of illustration and clarity, we estimate the faults every day
over the averaged residue. Note that in practice, the prediction
model Mi used in the generation of the graph GFR are not
a priori available. In this study, these predicted data have
been generated using a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space
(RKHS) identified model to capture the characteristics of flow
meters. More details on the forecasting model can be obtained
from [7]. Again, in case of zone 1, leaks and faults are not
1(in French) https://www.hydreos.fr/projets/sphereau/44.html
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distinguishable and all anomalies are labelled leaks (which can
take negative values).
1) Propagating estimated leaks: Before discussing the re-
sults of the algorithm, we describe another flexibility that
arises from the use of graph representation. Consider the case
when sensor data is missing or is stuck at constant value (that
is, any case where a simple observation or data pre-processing
can reveal fault). In these cases, it is possible to instruct the
Algorithm 2 to further restrain the set of possible solutions as
the ones containing the a priori detected faults.
For example, take the case of the sensor measuring zone 2
consumption (or Sensor 2 for convenience) which has Sensor
1 upstream. If Sensor 2 is declared uninformative, then it is
natural to remove it from the residual graph (just as if the
sensor did not exist). Consequently, if leaks can be estimated
for Sensor 1, they now represent leaks which are possibly
physically located either in Zone 1 or in Zone 2. In graph
theoretic terms, this would be equivalent to the merging of
the nodes 1 and 2 as shown in the Fig. 12. This suggests that,
in case of uninformative Sensor 2, leaks estimated at zone 1
provide an actual upper bound for possible leaks located either
in zone 1 or in zone 2. We subsequently term this transaction
as propagating estimated leaks towards missing sensors.
0
1
2
3
4
y1
y2
y3
y4
0
1, 2
34
y1
y3y4
Fig. 12: Node merging due to missing data in Sensor 2
To illustrate the results of the algorithm, the sensor data,
averaged residues obtained using the model predicted data, and
the estimated leaks (and faults) at different zones are given in
the Figs. 13-16. When data is uninformative (missing or stuck
at 0), the estimated leaks are obtained through propagation
from upstream sensors, as explained above, and is indicated
using grey hatchings over the cyan shaded region.
Though the real data did not have accurate ground truth,
a few details are known. The faults on Sensor 1, 2, and 3
are either missing data or stuck at a value. However, it is
understood from the field engineers that the sensor measuring
zone 4 experiences some drifts (to the point where it indicates
more flow that is measured upstream).
We make the following observations from the results:
Handling missing data: Consider the region from time = 0
to time = 190. During this period, data from Sensor 2 and 3
are missing (further, sensor 4 is missing around time = 120).
Here the graph is topologically modified enforcing faults in 2
and 3, and the leak estimated in Sensor 1 are propagated to
Sensors 2 and 3 (and 4 at time = 120).
Detectable structures: Between time = 350 and time =
484, the situation represents the case where the fault structure
is detectable and a solution of (9). The visualizations in the
Figs. 13-16 illustrate that the algorithm is able to disentangle
leaks and faults and properly assign them (according to field
engineers). This can be used for triggering alerts or reconstruct
the most plausible measure from combining the estimated
leaks and the identified RKHS model.
Hybrid Scenario: In the region between time = 280 and
time = 350 days, the Sensor 3 is down (stuck at zero). The
true solution of the problem here is most probably (according
to field engineers) that a leak is present in zone 3, a fault is
present in Sensor 3, and at time = 320 a leak appears in zone
4 while Sensor 4 also shows a drift. At this time, the true
fault structure is detectable according to Theorem 1 but (9)
has several solutions and the true solution is not one of them.
The solution of (9) locates a range of leaks and faults spread
out on sensor 2 and sensor 4. However, it can be seen that in
this case, by means of a priori fault detection on sensor 3 and
using leak propagation, an improved solution is obtained that
includes the true underlying solution.
With these observations, we have shown that the Algo-
rithm 2 provides a flexible approach in estimating the leaks
that can aid engineers by informing the uncertainty in the
estimated leaks/faults and hence take more informed decisions.
It is also possible to inform network managers that a given
network is at its limit in terms of detectability and explicitly
show which fault would imply undetectability, helping them
to prioritize physical interventions on the network.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we provided a novel modelling approach to
capture process and sensor faults in systems modelled as a
network using the graph representation. We derived graph-
theoretic conditions for simultaneous detectability of these
faults. We exploited these detectability results to develop a
leak estimation algorithm based on a regularized least square
problem, which shows more flexibility and lower computation
than an equivalent quadratic programming implementation.
The proposed approach has been tested both on simulated and
real-data issued from a rural water distribution network.
Further work is intended both from fundamental and leak
estimation application point of views. It would be imperative to
extend the presented theory to cases of dynamical relationships
between sensors or other types of networks (for example, when
the initial graph is not a DAG due to the presence of loops
or has multiple sources). Further, the structural property of
detectability can be used for the problem of placing sensors
in the network to improve detectability for different scenarios,
such as that in [25].
In terms of application to leak estimation, it will be useful to
incorporate different types of sensors, for instance, pressure or
level sensors in the water distribution network. Furthermore,
the optimization criterion presented can be improved by in-
corporating other type of constraints which rely on temporal
information. For example, consider that it is unlikely for
several leaks or faults to appear at the exact same day and
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Fig. 13: Leak Estimation at Zone 1 for the project data (hatch : propagated leaks)
Fig. 14: Leak/Fault Estimation at Zone 2 for the project data (hatch : propagated leaks)
time. This leads to a constraint on how much consecutive
estimations can differ. Finally, for large-scale networks, appli-
cation of this algorithm faces a challenge: the flow amplitudes
measured at the source and sink nodes will be considerably
different posing practical challenges in using this approach to
distinguish leaks and faults. Hence, a graph-partition approach
that splits the global network into optimal subgraphs where the
leak estimation approach can be directly applied would be of
interest.
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